I. INTRODUCTION
In criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to the accused the right of trial byjury.' Historically, the jury has been exalted as the conscience of the community and as a buffer between the state and the accused. 2 At the same time, however, there have been fears ofjuror incompetence and partiality. Juries that cannot or will not apply the law pose a danger to the liberties of a defendant. This concern is particularly relevant in capital cases where the severity and finality of the "ultimate" punishment require an accurate application of the law.
This comment discusses the sentencing jury's comprehension and application of the law in capital cases. Beginning with Section Two, this comment explores the jury's role as finder of fact, while warning against the danger of giving juries discretionary power which could lead to jury nullification. Section Three provides an overview of the sentencer's role in death penalty cases, focusing specifically on the Supreme Court's efforts to resolve the tension between avoiding the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty and handing down a sentence suited to the individual defendant. Section Four analyzes the effectiveness of pattern jury instructions, including evidence of juror incomprehension of such instructions. Finally, in Section Five, this comment concludes that defendants in death penalty cases must have the right to appellate review of juror comprehension of instructions. Without this right, defendants are not fully protected against the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
sel, Andrew Hamilton, decided to concede the issue of publication and argue the legal questions of whether the publication was libelous and whether truth should be a viable defense. Although both legal issues were decidedly against Zenger, 25 Hamilton argued that the jury must go beyond its traditional role as the finder of fact and nullify the law in order to return a true general verdict: 26 [Juries] have the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the facts, and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so. This of leaving it to the judgment of the Court whether the words are libelous or not in effect renders juries useless (to say no worse) in many cases. 27 Although the judge instructed the jury that they must follow the law, the jury returned a not guilty verdict.
At the time of the Zenger trial, and throughout the early years of the republic, there was a wide-spread uneasiness of government authority. The emerging philosophy of democracy motivated the people to seek control over almost every aspect of government, including the administration of law and justice. 28 Scott, supra note 19, at 416-17. As one jurist stated: "In many of the colonies... the arbitrary temper and unauthorized acts of the judges, holding office directly from the crown, made the independence of the jury, in law as well as fact, a matter of great popular importance." William v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 396 (1856). Furthermore, adherence to the political philosophy of democracy meant that the early American people had a basic distrust of legal experts and "a profound belief in the ability of the common man." Scott,
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SUSIE CHO thus came to represent an American tradition of the jury's right to decide the law. Over time, however, the justifications for jury nullification became less compelling. Suffrage was slowly granted, and thus, the people had greater input into government through their elected representatives. Such representatives included judges, who were no longer appointees of the crown but were instead either elected by the people, or appointed by representatives elected by the people.
9
Judges have since restricted the jury's prerogative to make the law. Culminating in Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 3 0 the Supreme Court has rejected the right ofjury nullification and limited the jury's role to that of finder of fact. As the Court stated in Sparf & Hansen, "[p] ublic and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court and become a law unto themselves." 3 1 Under a jury nullification system, the judge's primary duty would be to preside and keep order, while jurors who were untrained in the law would decide cases according to their perceptions of relevant legal principles. 3 2 As a result, the courts, although established in order to declare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of government as instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essential rights. When that occurs our government will cease to be a government of laws, and become a government of men. Liberty regulated by law is the underlying principle of our institutions.
33
After Sparf & Hansen, it is evident that jury nullification arose out of the Zenger trial solely as an extreme reaction to unrepresentative authority. Since this concern is no longer present, the Zenger trial does not support a right to jury nullification. [Vol. 85
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Apart from precedent, proponents ofjury nullification claim that the jury, as a representative cross-section of the community, 3 5 can provide a mechanism for legislative change, by nullifying unpopular and obsolete laws. 3 6 Jury nullification can thus provide a refuge for those who may have violated the letter, but not the spirit of the law. 3 7 Moreover, jurors who are forced by the judge's instructions to convict a defendant whose conduct they support, or at least feel is justifiable, will feel betrayed by a court that forces them to reach such a result. 3 8 This argument reveals an important difference between modem jury nullification doctrine and traditional doctrine: the proponent's assertion thatjurors have the right to vote according to their personal views of morality. 3 9 Today, nullification is urged not so that ajury can refuse to apply an oppressive law, 40 but rather so that the jury can further the defendant's political or social agenda. Antinuclear protest cases 4 ' and abortion protest cases 42 are examples where the defendant asked for ajury nullification instruction.
This argument fails to consider the fact that jury nullification of this kind would inhibit rather than encourage implementation of necessary legislative reform. 4 3 Advocating juries to ignore the law or to return a verdict contrary to both the evidence and the law invites chaos. Equaljustice is not served when one defendant is rescued from an unpopular law by jury nullification, because the perception is that justice is basically being done. 44 With this in mind, there is little in- 35 The assumption that juries are an effective and accurate spokesmodel for the community is weakened by the statistical research and the litigation surrounding the unrepresentative nature of the typical jury. Scott, supra note 19, at 422. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (white defendant objecting to prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove seven black venirepersons from the jury). Courts have almost universally condemned the doctrine of jury nullification. One study of 204 jury verdicts found that rule departures occurred only under fairly specialized circumstances, particularly in cases involving a serious offense, a young victim, or an employed defendant. 4 7 Considering the lack of judicial support for the doctrine ofjury nullification, any instances of departure from the law are disturbing. When jury nullification is motivated by sympathy, the verdict is acquittal, which may pose an injustice to society. Conversely, when nullification is motivated by prejudice or vengeance, the result is a conviction, which unjustly punishes an innocent person. To ensure equal justice, juries must confine their decisions within the given instructions. 48 Furthermore, although a jury may have the power to nullify the law in certain jurisdictions, it does not have the right. 49 Limiting the jury's role to finder of fact is especially vital to carrying out the objectives of the Supreme Court in its death penalty decisions. 50 Permitting an expansion of that role would promote arbitrary decisionmaking in an area of law where, considering the finality of the punishment, the defendant deserves "super due process" rights. 5 The role of the jury in death penalty sentencing is similarly unclear. 5 5 The commitment to the idea of trial by jury is less strong when the focus shifts from the guilt/innocence stage of the proceeding to determination of the sentence. 5 6 The instinctive belief about the imposition of the death penalty is that the decision is best reached by a group of citizens who share the responsibility for imposing such a drastic penalty. 5 
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65
In support of this conclusion, the Court stressed that granting juries discretion in sentencing was a response by the legislature to combat the problem of jury nullification. 66 Jury nullification was a problem that had to be addressed by "broader discretion" because death penalty statutes in effect at the time were harsh, requiring a mandatory sentence of death for certain offenses. The Supreme Court's pronouncement that it was not feasible to develop standards to guide jury sentencing in capital cases proved to be short-lived. In Furman v. Georgia, 68 the Court invalidated the death penalty laws in thirty-nine states as well as the federal death penalty law. 69 Because the jury had unbridled discretion to impose the death penalty, the Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Most states responded in one of two ways to Justice Stewart's opinion that the death penalty statutes at issue permitted "this unique penalty" to be "wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed." 71 Some states decided to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the culpability of the defendant; other states imposed a mandatory death sentence for a limited category of cases (thus completely eliminating discretion in those cases).
In a series of decisions in 1976, the Court attempted to refine and clarify its decision in Furman. 7 2 The Court upheld guided sentencing 64 Id. at 204. "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express the characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." Id.
65 74 The 1976 cases illustrate the difficulties in formulating a black letter rule in death penalty cases.
The Court explained in Gregg v. Georgia 75 that Furman required capital sentencing discretion to be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 76 A bifurcated procedure-where the question of sentence is not considered until the determination of guilt has been made-could eliminate the constitutional deficiencies addressed in Furman. 77 However, a bifurcated procedure "is not alone sufficient to guarantee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of punishment, especially if sentencing is performed by ajury." 78 Jurors have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing. The Court stated that courts could alleviate this problem if they gave juries guidance in their decisionmaking. 79 In a complete turnaround from the rationale in McGautha that standards could not be developed to guide a capital sentencingjury, 8 0 the Court maintained that mitigating and aggravating circumstances, when weighed against each other, would provide guidelines and reduce the possibility that ajury will impose an arbitrary or capricious sentence. 81 The Court, in Proffitt v. Florida, 8 2 upheld a sentencing scheme similar to that in Gregg; which weighed statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 8 3 Unlike the sentencing scheme in Gregg, Florida's sentencing scheme required the jury's role to be strictly advisory. The actual sentence was determined by the trial judge. Concluding that jury sentencing* had never been constitutionally required, 8 4 the Court stated that judicial sentencing should, if anything, result in greater consistency at the trial court level of capital punishment, because a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than ajury. 85 In addition, the trial judge can more uniformly mete out sentences similar to those handed down in cases with analogous fact patterns. 
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Thus, Florida's capital sentencing procedures adequately assured that the death penalty would not be applied in an arbitrary manner. 8 7 In Woodson v. North Carolina, 8 8 apprehension about jury idiosyncrasies led to a statutorily-mandated death sentence for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder. 8 9 The defendant argued that his punishment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 90 Agreeing with the defendant, the Court stated that the primary consideration in the application of the Eighth Amendment was a "determination of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of punishment." 9 1 "[I] ndicia of societal values.., included history and traditional usage, legislative enactments and jury determinations." 9 2
Regarding history, the Court noted that a majority of states had rejected mandatory death penalty statutes as unduly harsh and rigid. 93 The legislative trend toward discretionary sentencing statutes instead of automatic death penalty statutes reflected jurors' reluctance to convict persons of capital offenses in mandatory death penalty jurisdictions. Moreover, mandatory death penalty statutes did not provide any standard to guide the jury in its determination of which defendants would live and which would die. 95 The Court stated that
[i]nstead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the penalty determination on the particularjury's willingness to act lawlessly. While a mandatory death penalty may reasonably be expected to increase the number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death. 96 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the mandatory capital punishment scheme violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg, Proffitt, and Woodson demonstrate the Court's concern that unbridled jury discretion will result in a death sentence being "wantonly and... freakishly imposed." 9 8 Although the jury has been lim- 
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ited to finder of fact, the special nature of a death penalty sentencing does allow jurors some discretion to grant mercy. With this discretion comes the danger that jurors will not be able to impartially and fairly decide upon a sentence of life or death. The Court's dedication to a fair and equal imposition of the death penalty takes into account the fact that unbridled jury discretion in capital sentencing amounts to no more than a random distribution of death sentences. 9 9 The jury, using its discretion, would be "making law," with no means for a court to prevent the injustice.
C. LOCKET V, OHO." THE MOVE TOWARD INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
While stressing the need for non-arbitrary death sentences, the Court has at the same time required that the death sentence be imposed on the basis of individual culpability. Because of the qualitative difference between death and a sentence of imprisonment (however long), 10 0 there is a need to ensure that death is the appropriate punishment for a particular defendant. 0 1
Beginning with Woodson, the Court started to focus on individualized punishment. In Lockett v. Ohio,' 0 2 the Court struck down the Ohio death penalty statute because it precluded consideration of any and all mitigating factors. 10 3 The statute stated that once the defendant was found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one of the seven specified aggravating circumstances, the death penalty must be imposed unless the sentencing judge finds that one of three specified mitigating circumstances is established.
4
The Court held that the limited range of mitigating circumstances (which excluded such factors as participation in the offense and age) was incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 0 5 As a result, the Court determined that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. 10 6 The sentencer must consider and unusual").
99 See, e.g., Wood.son, 428 U.S. at 303 (rejecting mandatory death sentences because there was not opportunity for "the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death"). Id. at 605. Some of the Justices felt that the plurality had gone too far in allowing discretion to the sentencer. Justice White warned that the plurality's focus on individualization "invites a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was generally reserved for those very few for whom society has least consideration." Id. at 623 (White, J., as mitigating factors any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstance surrounding the offense that the defendant offers in mitigation. 10 7
D. THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK AGAIN
In the aftermath of Lockett, the range of mitigating factors found acceptable by the Court has included the defendant's emotional disturbance 0 8 and "good adjustment" to incarceration between arrest and trial. 10 9 However, in the ensuing years, the focus upon solving arbitrariness in sentencing has returned. 1 0 The Supreme Court decisions in Graham v. Collins' and Arave v. Creech' 2 support the renewed emphasis on limiting the sentencer's discretion so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.
In Graham, the Court upheld the former Texas capital sentencing system as applied to the defendant. The defendant had alleged that the three "special issues"" 8 his sentencing jury was required to answer under the former Texas capital sentencing statute prevented the jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence of his youth, unstable family background, and positive characteristics." 4 The Court found that mitigating evidence of family background and positive character traits was not within the statutory "special isconcurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court). Justice Rehnquist stated that "[i]f a defendant as a matter of constitutional law is to be permitted to offer as evidence in the sentencing hearing any fact, however bizarre, which he wishes.... the new constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it." Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 113 The capital-sentencing statute then in effect required the jury to answer three "special issues": 1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and 3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 896, quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(b) (West 1981).
114 Id. at 896.
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sues" that the jury was to consider." 5 Unlike in Lockett, where the sentencer was precluded from hearing certain types of mitigating evidence, the defense offered testimony concerning the defendant's upbringing and positive character traits. 1 1 6 The Court concluded that the statute complied with the Eighth Amendment because it allowed the defendant to place before the jury any mitigating evidence. The defense was thus able to direct the jury's attention to evidence of the defendant's age and potential for rehabilitation.' 7 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that a more narrow approach to determining relevant sentencing criteria was necessary." 8 Moreover, he stated that the Court should leave the question of which factors were relevant to the sentencing decision to elected state legislators." 19 In Arave, the Idaho Supreme Court had affirmed the defendant's death sentence, including the trial court's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance that the defendant "[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission .... exhibited utter disregard for human life."' 20 The defendant argued that the "utter disregard" aggravating factor did not adequately channel sentencing discretion. 12 '
The Court held tlhat the statutory aggravating circumstance met constitutional requirements. 122 The Court considered the statutory aggravating circumstance to be sufficiently objective to be determinable, 123 and decided that the phrase also sufficiently narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. 124 The construction adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court suitably limited and directed the sentencer's discretion to minimize the risk of arbitrary decision- 19941I 545
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despite the best efforts of courts and legislatures to ensure that capital punishment be imposed fairly and consistently, the imposition of the death penalty "remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake." 1 27 Justice Blackmun concluded that the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitutional.
28
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, relied on the text and tradition of the Constitution to explain the validity of the death penalty:
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital .. .crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... nor be deprived of life... without due process of law." This clearly permits the death penalty to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death penalty is not one of the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.'
29
Justice Scalia acknowledged the conflict between Furman's requirement that the sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty be closely confined and Lockett's requirement that the sentencer's discretion not to impose death be given wider reign. 130 Rather than hold that the death penalty was unconstitutional, however, Justice Scalia concluded that at least one of the judicially determined irreconcilable commands-the Lockett line of cases-must be wrong.' 3 '
The Court's compromise has been to require guided discretion. Veering too far toward a uniform standard threatens to bring back mandatory death sentence laws. On the other hand, a bold move toward truly individual sentences gives too much discretionary power to the sentencer, as a jury with unbridled discretion would be able to sentence defendants at whim. Although juries could exercise their 127 Id. at 1129. 128 Id. at 1138. 129 Id. at 1127. Justice Scalia argues that a "quiet death by lethal injection" is preferable to the death suffered by the victim in this case: "the murder of a man ripped by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly, with no opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs, and left to bleed to death on the floor of a tavern." Id. at 1128. Justice Scalia does not, however, set forth any criteria by which to judge which persons deserve more brutal deaths than others. Consider this Amnesty International account:
The U.S. news magazine Newsweek reported on 9 April 1984 that at his execution in March, James Autry "took at least ten minutes to die and throughout much of that time was conscious, moving about and complaining of pain." 
546
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
power of mercy and refuse to convict, the pendulum could easily swing in the other direction. Juries would also have the unreviewable power to sentence a defendant to death for any reason, whether it be justice or vengeance.1 3 2 In addition to going against the principles of Furman, granting that much power to the jury would amount to jury nullification. 133 The Court, however, may not have gone far enough in attempting to limit capriciousness. One potential mechanism to guarantee rationality in the process of sentencing is for the courts to provide juries with better and more comprehensible penalty phase instructions.' 3 4 Through tone, emphasis, and substance, comprehensive instructions can help deliberations run more smoothly and more fairly.' 3 5
IV. JURY INSTRUCIONS
A.
ROLE AND FUNCTION
The primary function ofjury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence so that the jury can arrive at a proper conclusion based on the law and the evidence.' 3 6 Fundamental fairness requires that the jury be supplied with basic instructions.' 3 7 Without such instructions, the jury would deliberate in an atmosphere of conjecture and speculation.
Pattern jury instructions are statements of the law designed by committees ofjudges and lawyers for presentation to jurors. Depend-132 As Justice Brennan noted, We are not presented with the slightest attempt to bring the power of reason to bear on the consideration relevant to capital sentencing. We are faced with nothing more than stark legislative abdication. Not once in the history of this Court, until today, have we sustained against a due process challenge such an unguided, unbridled, unreviewable exercise of naked power. 133 The possibility ofjury nullification-particularly in the direction of vengeance rather than mercy-is distressing when one considers a recent study. Pattern instructions emerged from a desire to simplify the process of choosing appropriate jury instructions and to reduce appellate court caseloads caused by alleged error in jury instructions. 140 The pattern jury instructions were thus designed to be concise, impartial, and accurate statements of law written in language the average juror could understand.
4 1
One advantage of pattern jury instructions is the impartiality of the charge. Instructions proposed by attorneys tend to be biased toward their respective parties. 14 2 Also, judges, even if they try to be impartial, may unintentionally guide the jury to the "correct" verdict. 14 3 Pattern jury instructions, on the other hand, are typically drafted by judges and attorneys representing both sides of the bar. 4 4 The instructions are also devised separately from specific fact situations. This provides a higher likelihood of impartiality than jury instructions drafted by the parties in a particular case. 139 An example of a pattern jury instruction regarding the sentencing stage of a death penalty case is as follows: § 7C.05 Outcome of Hearing Under the law, the defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence.
If you are unable to find unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court will impose a sentence [ (other than death) (of natural life imprisonment, and no person serving a sentence of natural life imprisonment can be paroled or released, except through an order by the Governor for executive clemency)]. [Vol. 85
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than traditional case-by-case instructions),146 they may feel safer using the pattern instructions than their own instructions. 147 Further since the instructions are the result of extensive research and discussion, and are designed to be the model of a technically correct charge, there is less chance that the instructions will result in an inappropriate sentence. 1 48 Their regular use tends to bring about "equality of treatment of like cases and provides a greater degree of fairness to those involved in the judicial process." 149 This is not to say, however, that pattern instructions are without disadvantages. One criticism is that they are too abstract. Drafters of standard instructions do not rely upon a specific set of facts, and courts use those instructions in all cases involving the issue which they cover. 150 Thus, "because they are written to apply in general, they do not apply effectively to any case in particular."' 51 Yet the problem may not be the abstractness of the instructions, but the failure to use them properly. For example, in some jurisdictions, judges cannot provide any context to the jury; they are either forbidden to refer to the evidence, or are discouraged from doing so for fear of being reversed. Another limitation pointed out by commentators is that pattern instructions discourage flexibility. Particularly when prepared by a committee of the state supreme court, pattern instructions are often regarded as "error-proof.' u5 3 Therefore, trial courtjudges are seldom willing to allow even minor modifications. 15 4 The tendency to "freeze" the legal language of pattern instructions results from trial court wariness and the general resistance to changing the language that has already been approved in appellate court opinions. 155 B.
COMPREHENSION OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The most serious charge against typical pattern jury instructions is thatjurors do not understand instructions. Instructions are drafted to be legally precise, and as far back as 1930, commentators have criticized jury comprehension of instructions. As the juristJerome Frank stated:
[t]ime and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words 146 Id. 
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156
One researcher studying the effect of judges' instructions found that eighty percent of his subjects did not understand basic rules of evidence and burdens of proof, 157 also demonstrating that "although pattern instructions may be effective in reminding jurors of concepts with which they already are generally familiar, they do not improve comprehension of new, difficult or counter-intuitive laws." 5 8
Some commentators assert that the emergence of instructions with convoluted sentence structure and complicated and confusing legal jargon is a side effect of appellate review.' 5 9 The sources ofjuror misunderstanding lay in the syntax of the instructions, the manner of presentation, and the general unfamiliarity of laypersons with legal terminology.
1 6 0 Accordingly, a few courts have recognized the importance of clear language injury instructions. In People v. Wilson,' 6 1 for example, the court reversed a jury verdict where the judge had given pattern instructions instead of using "concrete and direct language defining the rather simple issues of fact which the case presented." 162 Despite general agreement that most jurors do not fully understand the instructions given to them, some courts and commentators maintain that procedures can be easily implemented to protect the defendant. For instance, commentators have found that providing a proper context' 6 3 and repeating the instructions throughout the proceedings 6 4 aid juror comprehension. Moreover, some commentators have stated that procedural safeguards in the system can negate the effects of juror incomprehension. Attorneys can teach the jury the 162 Id. at 585. The court also stated that pattern instructions "can be of great value to the judge in preparing his charge to the jury, but it is a misuse of these resources to read to the jury a lengthy and confusing incantation..." Id. [Vol. 85
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meaning of the instructions during voir dire and in the opening and closing arguments. 165 During voir dire, lawyers may challenge any juror who does not understand the instructions or is unwilling to abide by the law. In addition, during opening statements and closing arguments, attorneys should be able to fully explain the law and the legal issues to the jury. 16 6 Unfortunately, juror education by attorneys is not a completely accepted solution. In fact, in some jurisdictions, courts do not provide any of these safeguards. 167 Considering the stakes for the defendant in a capital case, giving instructions without such procedural safeguards, when research suggests that the jurors do not otherwise understand them, is dangerous.
16 8 All efforts must be taken to avoid the arbitrary and capricious infliction of capital punishment. 6 9 Legislatures, courts, and attorneys need to make efforts to rewrite and improve pattern instructions to preserve the legitimacy of jury verdicts. On a broader scale, instructions should also be improved in order to maintain the symbolic importance of the right to trial by jury. 1 ' 70 The jury trial is a central part of the American justice system. To the typical American citizen, participation in government consists of voting or jury service or both. For many Americans, jury service may be their sole contact with the justice system. 1 ' 71 Incomprehensible jury instructions send a message to jurors that they are not expected to understand the law. The consequences can be severe: jurors may withdraw from the law, or they may turn to jury nullification and reach a verdict on their own. They may also lose faith in the criminal justice system as a whole. 
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SUSIE CHO to jury instructions to eliminate confusing language, simplify meaning, and present instructions clearly and logically. In one early study, the juror-subjects paraphrased fourteen pattern jury instructions. The researchers then rewrote the instructions to eliminate the words and constructions that seemed to cause confusion and tested the rewritten instructions on newjuror-subjects.' 73 As a result, the overall comprehension of instructions improved 35%. 174 The researchers noted that improvement had occurred even for instructions that were conceptually quite difficult. 175 The psycholinguistic principles derived from this study provided the impetus for further research. In another study that compared subject comprehension of pattern instructions with revised instructions, the overall comprehension error rate was 29.3% without any instructions, 24.3% when researchers used instructions, and 20.3% when the researchers used revised instructions.
176 Despite improvement, it is noteworthy that considerable errors in comprehension and application remained even with use of the revised instructions.
177
However slight the increase in understanding, rewritten instructions do make a difference. Unlike instituting new rules of trial procedure to permit judges to clarify ambiguous instructions 178 or to allow reading of instructions to the jury both before opening statements and after closing arguments, rewritten instructions are a more realistic means of improving comprehension. All that is needed is a commitment by states to rewrite their pattern instructions. 17 9 An important 173 Steele & Thornburg, supra note 170, at 87.
174 Id.; Charrow and Charrow's major psycholinguistic principles to enhance juror comprehension include: 1) Substituting active voice for passive voice; 2) Inserting "whiz" phrases ("which is" or "that is") where needed; 3) Eliminating multiple negatives; 4) Reorganizing sentences to properly locate misplaced phrases and eliminate complicated embedding; 5) Reducing item lists and strings to no more than two, where possible; 6) Using directives such as "must", "should", and permissives such as "may" to help focus the jurors' attention; 7) Replacing uncommon words with ones that are more common in the language; and 8) Rearranging existing instructions into a more logical organization. In addition, institutional forces contribute to the continued use of incomprehensible instructions. One is resistance to change. Many members of the legal community are unaware of the seriousness of the problem and are untrained in statistical analysis. Many lawyers and judges are skeptical of empirical research.' 8 ' Because they themselves understand the instructions, they assume thatjurors understand them as well. 182 Other attorneys believe that juror incomprehension benefits their clients and therefore, they support the status quo. The belief among these attorneys is that if the jury fails to understand certain "technical" defenses, the party with the burden of proof or the one more aligned with the jury's instinctive feelings of "justice" will win.
183
Still others resist change because of the cost and time necessary to rewrite the instructions, which must either be billed to the client or absorbed by the lawyer. 184 Furthermore, judges have few incentives to change pattern instructions. Trial courts risk reversal when they deviate from the pattern instruction or the language of appellate opinions.' 8 5 However, considering that the empirical research on juror comprehension has only shown a slight improvement in juror understanding as a result of rewriting instructions, still more is needed to safeguard defendants' rights in capital cases. For example, although research on capital sentencing instructions demonstrated that the new North Carolina capital penalty phase pattern instructions were better attorneys using psycholinguistic methods resulted in improved understanding of pattern instructions). Appellate review of jury instructions has tended to focus on the extent to which instructions reflect the law. Courts scrutinize jury instructions for legal accuracy while ignoring juror comprehensibility. In cases where appellate courts have recognized jury misunderstanding, the courts will nonetheless accept the mistake, not deeming the error to be great enough to warrant reversal.' 8 7 For example, in Sellers v. United States,' 8 8 the jurors misunderstood a self-defense instruction and found the defendant guilty of homicide. Although the jurors later stated that they would have acquitted the defendant if they had understood the instruction, the court refused to change the verdict.' 8 9
Viewing the incomprehension issue as an assertion of the jury's right to impeach its verdict, the court in Sellers concluded that the jury cannot do so on the basis of behavior inherent in a verdict. 190 The partial concurrence/partial dissent in Sellers argued that due process questions are raised where a misunderstanding of the law leads jurors to convict when they had intended to acquit: "[A] court is compelled to balance the possible public injury of undermining verdict finality against the possible private injury to a litigant amounting to deprivation of a constitutional right." 19 190 Id. at 981-82. Jurors also cannot attack the verdict on the ground that they had agreed to abide by majority vote, that they failed to follow instructions, that they had been confused, or that ajuror who had agreed to a guilty verdict did not fundamentally believe in the defendant's guilt. Id. at 982.
191 Id. at 982-83. However, the partial concurrence/partial dissent maintained that juror testimony regarding confusion on instructions per se would not be admissible. See id. at 983. A distinction between juror misunderstanding and juror confusion seems disingenuous. One can argue that the jurors' confusion was the result of their misunderstanding of the given instructions. Furthermore, ifjurors were confused by their instructions, perhaps the problem lies in the law itself, not in the instructions (which are written to express the law).
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In contrast to the majority in Sellers, the Seventh Circuit has addressed the problem of juror incomprehension of instructions as a due process issue. In Gacy v. Welborn, 9 2 the court gave little credence to a juror comprehension study suggesting that jurors did not adequately understand the Illinois death penalty pattern instructions. Although the court offered a more understandable instruction as an alternative to the instruction actually given 9 3 and noted that "[p]6lysyllabic mystification reduces the quality of justice,"' 9 4 the court nonetheless resigned itself to the imperfections of the trial system. "[E]ven [a] 'simplified' charge would leave manyjurors dumbfounded .... As there are no perfect trials, so there are no perfect instructions." 195 In Free v. Peters, 19 6 the defendant, in his petition for habeas corpus, argued that the specific instructions given to the jury at sentencing did not provide jurors with sufficient constitutional guidance. 197 Based upon ajury comprehension study testing the Illinois pattern jury instructions (found to be similar to the instructions in the Free trial) and psycholinguist experts, the district court had determined that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury was confused about the availability of nonstatutory mitigating factors, the nature of the burden of persuasion, and which side, if any, had the burden. 198 The district court had found empirical evidence persuasive in its finding that a reasonable juror would not have understood the instructions. 199 The Seventh Circuit disagreed and reversed the grant of habeas corpus issued by the district court. 2 0 0 The court, considering the instructions as a whole and in the context of the entire sentencing hearing, determined that there was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury could have misunderstood the Illinois death penalty statute. 193 See id. at 307. Perhaps strong feelings among court and jury members about the petitioner (a serial murderer who killed at least 33 young men) subtly influenced the decision. The court made much of the fact that the jurors were most likely not confused about the given instructions because the deliberations were finished and verdicts were brought out in less than two hours. See id. at 308. The short amount of time spent in deliberations just as easily could have been the result ofjurors' desire to impose the death sentence and their unwillingness to fully consider mitigating evidence as required by statute. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1994 results of such an examination offer insight into the ability of a real jury, which has spent days or weeks becoming familiar with the case and has had the benefit of oral presentations by witnesses, lawyers, and the judge, and which renders a verdict after discussion rather than in the isolation of an examination setting.
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In addition to brushing aside juror admissions and empirical evidence ofjuror misunderstanding, courts have thwarted efforts to clarify ambiguous jury instructions. For example, the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that
The court may not summarize the evidence, express or otherwise indicate to the jury any personal opinion on the weight or credibility of any evidence, or give any instruction regarding the desirability of reaching a verdict.
2 0 3
The practice of forbidding judges to comment on the evidence renders the court's instructions awkward, as jurors are given little context within which to apply their charge. The Supreme Court's review ofjury instructions has been equally closed-minded. According to the Court, the jury trial system depends on the "crucial assumption ... that juries will follow the instructions given by the trial judge. where the Court cited social-scientific sources as supporting the proposition that segregation has a detrimental effect on children, the Court is disparaging of social science evidence. 2 0 7
